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SEX, GENDER, AND THE NEED FOR LEGAL
CLARITY: THE CASE OF TRANSSEXUALISM
MEREDITH GOULD*
INTRODUCTION
Societies have historically created institutions to organize and
control all aspects of human relationships; this is a substantive con-
cern of social theory. The modern legal system exemplifies one in-
stitutionalized means of social control that emerged as religion,
myth, and ritual life lost significance in the face of growing
secularization.' Grounded in the Judeo-Christian ethic, the law is a
contemporary moral code, circumscribing acceptable behavior and
social participation for human actors in a given society; a code not
infrequently based on assumptions about the impact of sex status
upon personality and sociality.!
In general, persons seem to be either female or male, and are
assumed to be so without much concern. The law treats this
biological dichotomy as a behavioral imperative by collapsing and
confusing sex, a biological condition, with gender, its socio-cultural
manifestation. Consequently, femaleness and maleness are viewed as
characteristics indistinguishable from masculine and feminine role
performance. Legal codes are constructed to regulate both sexual
behavior and social performances as if sex status had intrinsic and
immutable social meaning. That the law does effect significant policy
regarding the management of individuals based on sex, and the im-
plicit gender assumptions of a sexist society8 should concern legal
*Thomas A. Edison College of New Jersey; B.A. Queens College, C.U.N.Y.,
1975; M.A. New York University, 1978. The critical support and encouragement of
Giles R. Scofield is gratefully acknowledged. The substantive and editorial assistance
of Sylvia Law and Edwin M. Schur is also noted.
1. The documentation and analysis of this process was a substantive task of
the major social theorists. See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE
RELIGIOUS LIFE (1965); E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1933); M.
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1958); M. WEBER, THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947). For commentaries on the above,
see A. GIDDONS. CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY (1971).
2. W. BARNETT. SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973) (Chapter 4 in
particular); Gould, Statutory Oppression An Overview of Legalized Homophobia, in
GAY MEN: THE SOCIOLOGY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY 51 (E. Levine ed. 1979).
3. J. MITCHELL, WOMEN'S ESTATE 64-65 (1974).
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scholars. Certainly the presence and impact of gender assumptions
on such things as inheritance,' tax and employment benefits, ' child
custody,6 alimony 7 and the like are legal concerns perhaps inten-
sified, but not originating in the contemporary women's movement.
Transsexuals are persons who seek to alter their sex by hor-
monal and surgical means because of a deep psychosocial identifica-
tion with what is considered an inappropriate gender for that sex.
Since 1966, when the Johns Hopkins Hospital and the University of
Minnesota started providing the sex reassignment surgery previously
unobtainable in the United States, courts have confronted a steadily
growing number of cases concerning unusual changes in vital
records, "false" arrests for transvestism, and other legal issues
seemingly endemic to transsexualism. In both their pre-operative
and post-operative states, transsexuals merit study on at least two
accounts. First, transsexuals have an ambiguous social and legal
status. It will be noted in this paper, as it is elsewhere,9 that courts
have been unable to satisfactorily deal with transsexuals in an even-
handed manner. Second, and perhaps more important, the ambiguity
transsexualism10 represents challenges fundamental assumptions
4. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Hamett v. Hamett, 46 Ala. App. 206, 239 So. 2d 778 (Civ. App.
1970); Shaw v. Shaw, 249 Ark. 835, 462 S.W.2d 222 (1971); Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N.Y.
391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949).
7. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dennis, 35 Cal. App. 3d 279, 110 Cal. Rptr. 619
(1973); Glover v. Glover, 64 Misc. 2d 374, 314 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Fain. Ct. 1976).
8. Browell, M.T. v. JT.: An Enlightened Perspective on Transsexualism, 6
CAP. U.L. REV. 403 (1977); Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L.
REV. 282 (1967-68); Matto, The Transsexual in Society, CRIMINOLOGY, May, 1972, at 85;
Smith, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV.
963 (1971); Wetherbee, Transsexuals: Rights Under and Problems With the Law, 3
SEXUAL L. REP. 1 (1977); Note, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Defini-
tion of Sex, 31 MD. L. REV. 236 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Transsexuals in Limbo];
Comment, Transsexuals in Search of Legal Acceptance: The Constitutionality of the
Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 331 (1978).
9. Id.
10. It is important to note that this refers to the transsexual phenomenon, not
individual transsexual behavior. The distinction is important since transsexuals desire
most of all to be normally integrated into middle class society. Their stereotypical
femininity highlights the ideal type of American womanhood. Transsexuals have also
been criticized as the "Uncle Toms" of the sexual liberation movement because of their
lack of militancy. Not all researchers share this opinion. For discussions of both views,
compare Kando, Males, Females, and Transsexuals: A Comparative Study of Sexual
Conservatism, 1 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 45 (1974), with Feinbloom, Fleming, Kijewski,
Schulter, Babcock, Freedman, Norton & Ross; Lesbian/Feminist Orientation Among
Male-to-Female Transsexuals, 2 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Feinbloom, et al.].
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underlying sex and gender based classifications in the law and society
as well, insofar as law is constructed by and reflexive of society.
To date, the legal problems of transsexuals have been addressed
in scattered journal notes and comments limited exclusively to their
particular concerns." This paper takes a somewhat different ap-
proach. The legal problems of transsexuals are viewed here as
signifiers of more general considerations. The task here is an exposi-
tion of the transsexual phenomenon as it relates to issues of sex and
gender in the law, to demonstrate how legal remedies for this
special group illustrates the legal reification of inequalities suffered
by women and sexual minorities.
UNTANGLING SEX AND GENDER
The Supreme Court has traditionally dealt with sex and gender
by either failing to distinguish between the biological and the social,
thereby treating them as interchangeable, or by deferring
altogether to social stereotypes of behavior. This is particularly evi-
dent in older cases involving occupational discrimination against
women. These offer abundant examples of custom legislatively
transformed into statute. When challenged, statutes arbitrarily
limiting female participation in the labor force, were upheld by
courts. Never addressed was the question why women qua women
should receive disparate treatment-apart from an anachronistic,
paternalistic concern for women in society."
A classic case from the late 1800's, Bradwell v. Illinois,"8 con-
cerned the right of married women to be licensed for practice by the
Illinois bar. While ostensibly focusing on the privileges and im-
munities clause of the 14th Amendment, and whether occupational
choice constituted one such civil right, the concurring opinion by
Justice Bradley specifically addressed the propriety of certain oc-
cupational pursuits for "women as citizens."" Noting the lack of
legal existence for married women, this opinion illustrates the
ideological power of social stereotyping:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life. ...
11. See note 8 supra.
12. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
13. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
14. Id. at 140.
1979]
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The paramount destiny and mission of women are to
fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society
must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and
cannot be based upon exceptional cases."5
Little more than half a century later, Goesaert v. Cleary16
challenged a Michigan statute distinguishing between women
bartenders and women mixing drinks in bars owned by their male
relatives. Here the Court accepted the premise that Michigan's in-
terest was protective insofar as "ownership of a bar by a barmaid's
husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid,""
and rejected the political economic plausibility that the "real im-
pulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male
bartenders to try to monopolize the calling."'" Justice Frankfurter
disavowed the impact of changing social norms by declaring: "The
Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological in-
sight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards."'" Both Bradwell and
Goesaert reflect a social climate Justice Brennan later characterized
as one of "romantic paternalism,"" and illustrate the remarkable
durability of underlying social and moral assumptions about women.
Recent opinions identify and maintain physical characteristics
as those traits that set women apart from men. Sex is seen as an im-
mutable characteristic which, like race, is determined solely by the
accident of birth."' Yet unlike race, sex is not considered a suspect
classificationn even though sex discrimination imposes special
disabilities upon members of a particular sex because of their
"special physical organization."" Because cultural myths about
gender behavior are indeed sex specific, laws that perpetuate
assumptions about women or men 4 are, under this test, subject to
constitutional attack."
15. Id. at 141-42.
16. 355 U.S. 464 (1948).
17. Id. at 466.
18. Id. at 467.
19. Id. at 466.
20. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
21. Id. at 686.
22. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAW 87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as B. BABCOCK. et aLl.
23. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908).
24. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.
Fla. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 385, cert. denied 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
25. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1977); Craig v.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss3/1
SEX, GENDER AND TRANSSEXUALISM
Yet even the Court's reliance on a strict physiological approach
has been inconsistent. Beginning with Geduldig v. Aiello," the Court
announced that pregnancy, a temporary physical condition ap-
plicable only to women, is not sex specific. The Court reversed one
case, dealing with mandatory pregnancy leaves, which reasoned that
distinctions based on pregnancy do not discriminate on the basis of
sex because pregnancy does not, in physiological terms, place
women in direct competition with men.' Yet in Geduldig, the Court
held that such a distinction can only differentiate between women
who are pregnant, and non-pregnant persons; in this latter class are
included both women and men." If the Court's reasoning is as purely
physiological as its sex standard suggests, the distinction is disturb-
ingly imprecise. A physiological distinction would have to separate
women who can become pregnant from those persons who cannot;
men cannot, and some women, because of certain gynecological con-
ditions, also cannot." Not all women, however, who are not pregnant
cannot become pregnant; they may choose to remain childless,
regardless of their procreative ability and despite the sanctification
of motherhood in American society. Geduldig and its successors in-
dicate that within a class based on sex, there are differences that
are not sex specific. Consequently, individuals within the designated
class may avoid physiological generalizations while remaining prey
to social expectations.
In City of Los Angeles v. Manhartk on the other hand, the
basis for declaring unconstitutional an unequal pension payment pro-
gram was the recognition that the program rationale, ie., women as
a class outlive men, does not apply equally to all women. Some
women do not live longer than men or even other women who have
shorter life expectancies. This suggests that a permissible class
might well consist of women who choose to live longer than men.
The Court in Manhart does not make clear that its reasoning is based
on whether a person is physically able to opt out of an otherwise
sex-specific class.
The Court uses the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably
to describe physical characteristics. Moreover, court decisions are
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
26. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
27. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
28. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976).
29. This distinction is suggested in note 5 of Stevens' dissent to General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 (1976).
30. 435 U.S. 702 (1977).
1979]
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often based on distinctions other than those that are purely
physical. This interchangeability obscures the criteria which actually
underlie distinctions the Court seeks to make within the class of
women, or between women and men.
The Court's apparently inconsistent treatment of "sex"
discrimination cases, which appalls commentators,"' highlights the
concern generated by its equally inconsistent terminology. The
biological aspects of existence are not absolute determinates of social
behavior; to assume such a blend only furthers the current confusion
in the courts.' The terms "sex" and "gender" denote distinct mean-
ings in the social sciences. Despite a legal tradition of autonomous
reality, these distinctions must be addressed by the Court.
THE SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH
In advanced, post-industrial societies, sex, gender, and sexuality
are usually and erroneously treated as synchronic features of identi-
ty. While there is a high degree of overlap between sex status,
gender role, and sexual orientation, these elements are not
necessarily congruent and have varied considerably trans-
historically and cross-culturally." That these features are inelegantly,
and for the most part inaccurately lumped together, obscures mean-
ingful distinctions which, if clarified, would elucidate the social par-
ticipation of women and men in society. This point is of critical con-
cern to sociologists committed to delineating the processes by which
individuals gain a sense of self, organize their social behavior, and
participate in social institutions."
31. Zeitlin & Lee, Women and the Law, in 1971-72 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 189;
Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.
617 (1974).
32. It is important not to reduce the argument to one of lexicography. The
issue is one of maintaining a consistent use of particular terms which have gained a
degree of validity in the literature of professions relied upon by courts and
legislatures. Concepts and referents must be clearly, consistently distinguished. For
further discussion of this, see Gould and Kern-Daniels, Toward a Sociological Theory
of Gender and Se2z 12 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 182 (1977).
33. See, e.g., M. MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES
(1939); R. REITER, TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN (1975); WOMEN, CULTURE AND
SOCIETY (M. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere eds. 1956).
34. See, e.g., Gould and Kern-Daniels, supra note 32; Lopata and Thorn, On
the Term "Sex Roles," 3 SIGNS 718 (1978); Thorne, Is Our Field Misnamed? Toward a
Rethinking of the Concept of "Sex Roles," ASA SECTION ON SEX ROLES NEWSLETTER,
Summer, 1976; Tresemer, Assumptions Made About Gender Roles in ANOTHER VOICE
308 (1975).
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The legal inconsistencies outlined in the previous section, and
the focus of this paper, transsexuals, exemplify the consequences of
imprecision. The transsexual phenomenon in particular only begins
to make sense when a clear distinction is drawn between sex and
gender. An explication of the conceptual difference between sex and
gender is thus important.
Sex Status
At birth, individuals are assigned a sex status that, for most,
remains constant throughout adult life. This assignment is based on
prima facie evidence, a quick and cursory assessment of visible
genitalia. Everyone, except hermaphrodites,' is designated female
or male. Physiological sex is, however, more complicated than exter-
nal sex characteristics. More rigorous standards for assessment
have been suggested by Money and other psycho-endocrinologists"
who maintain sex is based on the interface of at least eight variables
that more accurately determine maleness and femaleness. These
variables include:
1. Sex Chromosomes: The arrangement of X and Y
chromosomes;
2. Gonads: Ovaries and testes;
3. Hormonal Composition: The amounts of progesterone,
estrogen, and testosterone;
4. Internal Sex Organs (other than gonads): E.g., the
uterus, the vas deferens;
5. External Genitalia: Clitoris and penis;
6. Secondary Sex Characteristics: Body and facial hair
patterns;
7. Sex of Rearing: Girl or boy;
8. Core Gender Identity: Femininity or masculinity.
This list is not necessarily complete, nor does maleness or
femaleness depend upon a total complementarity of the variables.
The isolation of any one medically-based criterion" is insufficient to
35. Hermaphrodites and pseudo-hermaphrodites are, respectively, individuals
in which either both male and female gonads are present, or the gonads are of one sex
or the other but contradicted by the external genitalia of the opposite sex.
36. C. HUTT, MALES AND FEMALES (1972); E. MACCOBY. THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SEX DIFFERENCES (1966); J. MONEY & A. ERHARDT, MAN AND WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL
(1972); R. STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER (1968); TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT
(R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969).
37. Note neither "sex of rearing" nor "core gender identity" are medically
based. For a full discussion of this with regard to legal implications, see Smith, supra
note 8, at 965.
1979]
Gould: Sex, Gender, and the Need for Legal Clarity: The Case for Transse
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
430 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
determine sex. Individuals are finally considered either female or
male according to the congruence between external genitalia, secon-
dary sex characteristics and core gender identity.
Gender Role
As is the case with any other status, sex bears societal
prescriptions for social behavior; sociologists call this behavior a
gender role." Dimensions of masculinity and femininity are socially,
culturally, and psychologically produced sets of characteristics;
behavior deemed the social property of females and males. These
characteristics are "fixed" only insofar as society can control the
establishment and perpetuation of such definitions through informal
and formal sanctions. Social standards for femininity and masculinity
will alter as cultural determinants shift.
The confusion of sex status with social role is clearly il-
lustrated by parenting in the United States.' Women are the only
sex biologically capable of childbearing. Both women and men are
capable of child rearing, although this has evolved into a primarily
female, hence, feminine, task.0 The historical emergence of the
assumed blend of biological and social motherhood constitutes an en-
tire body of scholarship that cannot be recapitulated here." For now
it is sufficient to note that in contemporary American society, affec-
tive and expressive functions"' are relegated to women because of
their capacity for, if not actual involvement in, reproduction. While
all societies develop some notion of what comprises sex appropriate
behavior, sex related role expectations differ according to the
political economy and cultural context. Thus what constitutes
"masculinity" in one epoch might well constitute "femininity" in
another.
38. See note 34, supra and accompanying text. See also L. DUBERMAN, GENDER
AND SEX IN SOCIETY (1975); A. OAKLEY. SEX, GENDER AND SOCIETY (1975).
39. See table in Gould & Kern-Daniels, supra note 32, at 184.
40. This has been rechallenged by sociobiologists. For a representative discus-
sion of this position regarding women's biological superiority at motherhood, see Rossi,
A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, DAEDALUS, Spring, 1977, at 1.
41. An explanation of this has engaged social theorists of every persuasion
from structural functionalists to orthodox Marxists. For a general sense of the scope of
such scholarship, see N. GLASER & H. WAEHRER. WOMEN IN A MAN MADE WORLD (2d ed.
1977); A. JAGGER & P. STRUHL, FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS (1978).
42. These are terms popularized by functional theorists. See Komarousky,
Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles, 52 AM. J. Soc. 184 (1946); Parsons, Age and Sex
in the Social Structure of the United States 7 AM. Soc. REv. 604 (1942).
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In a patriarchal, 8 sexist society, power is controlled by men,
and women are considered biologically and socially inferior. This
rigid social order is reflected in sex specific rules for gender
behavior. Gender expectations in contemporary American society in-
clude an implicit value assumption: whatever males do is
"masculine," normal, and therefore good, whatever women do is
"feminine" and intrinsically inferior." Masculinity and femininity
share an uneasy relationship and are seen as antagonistic, yet comp-
lementary, irreconcilable opposites.
Already it is possible to see that what are considered sex based
classifications at law cannot be viewed simply as regulation by bio-
medical definition. The issue is significantly complicated by the fact
that societies develop and inculcate patterns of behavior in their
members. Considering the sociological distinction between sex and
gender may clarify constitutional questions emerging in sex
discrimination cases. Cases such as Bradwell and Goesaert'5 are in-
stances of gender discrimination since they are based on socially
produced notions of what men and women can or should do. Women
and men are, in these cases, excluded from occupational participa-
tion because job related tasks require a dimunition or abandonment
of "femininity" or "masculinity." They require behavior that is "in-
appropriate." Cases such as Geduldig4' are, in fact, examples of sex
discrimination. They are based on the only sex specific
characteristic that could possibly delimit social participa-
tion"-reproductive functions. Separating gender assumptions from
sex role constraints requires a strict scrutiny of the relationship be-
tween a physical condition, albeit temporary, and the ability to com-
petently perform any given social task.' For example, excluding
43. Patriarchy here is defined as "a set of social relations which has a
material base and in which there are hierarchical relations between men, and solidarity
among them, which enable them to control women. Patriarchy is thus the system of
male oppression of women." Hartman, Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by
Sex 1 SIGNS no. 3, pt. 2, at 138 n.1 (1976). For theories of patriarchy, see K. MILLETT,
SEXUAL POLITICS (1969); E. ZARETSKY, CAPITALISM, THE FAMILY AND PERSONAL LIFE
(1973).
44. Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz & Vogel, Sex-Role
Stereotypes and Clinical Judgments of Mental Health, 34 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCH. 1 (1970); Homer, FaiL- Bright Women, PSYCH. TODAY, November, 1969, at 36.
45. See also Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559
(S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
46. See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
47. See B. BABCOCK, et aL, supra note 22, at 241.
48. These are examples of restrained or passive standards of review. The "ra-
tional relation" test is thoroughly discussed in B. BABCOCK et aL, supra note 22, at 71.
It is suggested that the recognition of such sets of characteristics would have
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pregnant women from teaching because of their condition is both
gender and sex discrimination. It is discrimination based on sex
because only women become pregnant. It is also gender discrimina-
tion because it is based on social custom precluding women from
participation, or even visibility, during pregnancy." This is invidious
discrimination.
A social science approach acknowledges the interaction be-
tween society and the individual. In this paradigm, sex is viewed as
salient only insofar as societies create and maintain definitions for
that status. Such a heavy reliance on the fluctuations of human
perception is, however, in opposition to the establishment of consis-
tent and durable legal principles. Yet the law's need for set
behavioral rules necessarily flounders when faced with variations of
gender related behavior where, in fact, it is futile to establish a
"norm."
For many, the social reality of gender is ontologically in-
tolerable; some of these people may consider themselves transsex-
ual. By having the somatic status of one sex and the psychosocial
identity of the other, transsexuals demonstrate the clash between
social, medical, and legal realities. Without exception, considerations
that first bring transsexuals to the courts whether for changes in
vital records, unreasonable searches for transvestism, or issues in
family law, necessitate a consistent definition of sex that can be
distinguished from gender. The law has failed to develop such a
definition.
In this context, courts must rely on the expertise of others, for
at its base, sex determination is an extra-legal matter, becoming
legal only under certain conditions. Transsexualism is one such con-
dition. In most cases,51 courts take a conservative stance toward sex,
favoring what they suppose to be coherent medical distinctions and
a unanimity of opinion. The courts' reliance solely on medical
knowledge might be considered at best myopic. Medical opinion is
not entirely reliable when held up to other measures of social reality,
particularly with regard to sex. As one commentator has noted:
The more one surveys the literature, the more it
becomes apparent that the medical profession, and par-
an impact in case where a "bona fide occupational qualification" is applied and where a
court primarily avoids sex issues, relying instead on gender based tests. See Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1970). See also B.
BABCOCK, et aL, supra note 22, at 230.
49. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
50. See notes 110, 111, 124 and 129 infra and accompanying text.
I
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ticularly psychiatry, has not so much found norms in
nature as it has imposed theological ideals on nature: God
created them male and female; male and female created
He them. The profession's task, like that of a priesthood,
is to preserve inviolate this divinely ordained dichotomy
between the sexes. Not only is a chasm fixed between the
two, so that none may cross from one side to the other,
but every blurring of the line must also be stamped out."
The following section deals specifically with transsexuals,
human casualties of the sex and gender imbroglio.
TRANSSEXUALS, GENDER IDENTITY AND DYSPHORIA
The formation of gender identity 5 is a complex phenomenon
about which much has been written and more needs to be known."
As one component of self, gender identity emerges out of social in-
teraction on an interpersonal and institutional level. It is thought to
be fixed at a very early age, previous to the acquisition of
language." In a gender-rigid, sexist society, self-identity is inimically
bound with sex considerations. To maintain, however, that gender
identity is simply the identifiable components of masculinity or
femininity, without examining the social context for the emergence
and definition of those components, is inherently tautological,
perpetuating and making static the possible range of human options
and alternatives to sex related behavior.
In becoming socialized, one learns sex appropriate rules or
norms for behavior. When those rules are in transition, lack clear
delineation, or actively defy the social life experience of the human
actor, that person may suffer "gender dysphoria." Gender dysphoria,
then, is dissatisfaction with one's socially assigned gender role. This
is most frequently experienced by women facing conflicting expecta-
tions about their social participation.' Recent literature also focuses
on the changing male role and the dysphoria men feel because of the
constraints of masculinity."
51. See W. BARNETT, supra note 2, at 246 n.68.
52. Sexual identity may refer to one's sense of femaleness or maleness, but is
most generally used to describe a person's sexual orientation or erotic object choice.
53. See note 36 supra.
54. See note 36 supra.
55. Raymond, Transsexualism: The Ultimate Homage to Sex-Role Power, 3
CHRYSALIS 11 (1977).
56. See, e.g., M. FASTEAU. THE MALE MACHINE (1975); THE FORTY-NINE PER-
CENT MAJORITY: THE MALE SEX ROLE (D. David & R. Brannon eds. 1976); MEN AND
MASCULINITY (J. Pleck & J. Sawyer eds. 1974).
19791
Gould: Sex, Gender, and the Need for Legal Clarity: The Case for Transse
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
434 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
Selective reinforcement for gender specific behavior occurs in
childhood when all individuals learn societal norms. This process
somehow fails for transsexuals who, despite all modal gender rein-
forcement, assert a core gender identity of the opposite sex. The in-
cidence and prevalence of transsexuals is not as rare as has been
previously thought or noted." Transsexuals are anatomically,
chromosomally, and hormonally of one sex, but have the
psychosocial or gender identity of the opposite. They are neither
homosexual" nor transvestic 5 and express their dilemma as one of
being "trapped in the wrong body." Transsexuals comprise a com-
plex population, including persons of all races, ethnic groups, ages,
and socio-economic statuses.N
The first task in any sex reassignment program61 is the iden-
tification of the actual transsexual from those "merely" suffering
gender dysphoria. That most transsexuals attempt self-castration or
suicide when medical intervention is unobtainable provides compel-
ling evidence of the seriousness of their predicament. Transsexuals
are distinguished by their absolute, unshakeable core gender identity
which remains firmly established despite conventional psychiatric or
psychoanalytic intervention. This understandably baffles medical
practitioners. It is important to note, however, that this "mistaken
identity" can only occur in a society where gender and sex are ab-
solutely merged; a society allowing so little flexibility of expression,
that one can indeed suffer extreme psychic distress at being of one
sex and the "opposite" gender." Be that as it may, transsexuals
have real legal needs that are not being addressed by the courts.
This is. in part because of the legal system's fundamental inability to
develop any consistent guidelines about sex.
57. As of 1969, the number of transsexuals in the United States did not ex-
ceed 10,000. TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT, supra note 36, at 10 (Introduc-
tion by Green & Money).
58. The work of Feinbloom et al, supra note 10, suggests this might be an in-
correct assumption: "Biological women and male-to-female transsexuals present a
similarly vast range of sexual orientation and life-style choices; different choices are
valid for different people." Id. at 69.
59. D. FEINBLOOM, TRANSVESTITES AND TRANSSEXUALS (1976).
60. Id. See also Simpson, Sex Change Clinics Provide New Identities for
Troubled Patients, Wall St. J., January 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
61. Sex reassignment programs such as those at Johns Hopkins typically in-
volve a four step process of screening, evaluation, treatment and patient follow-up. For
a detailed description of each step, see Holloway, supra note 8, at 285.
62. See Raymond, supra note 55.
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TRANSSEXUALS AND THE LAWS
Legal predicaments faced by transsexuals typically involve
cross-dressing, a pre-operative requisite, and vital record alteration,
a post-operative necessity." Such confrontations with the law are
not exclusively limited to transsexuals. In fact, the statutes con-
sidered here pre-date the known existence of transsexuals." The
discrepancies that emerge when these laws are enforced against
transsexuals reveal their implicit gender assumptions.
Cross-Dressing
Pre-operative transsexuals, as the term suggests, are persons
awaiting sex reassignment surgery. Reassignment programs require
pre-ops to "cross live" as members of their desired post-operative
sex for up to two years prior to surgery. Because cross-dressing is
fundamental to treatment, pre-operatives live in fear and danger of
arrest and conviction for transvestism. During this period, both
male to reconstructed females and female to reconstructed males"
additionally undergo hormonal treatment, psychotherapy, and
psycho-social adjustment training.6 This treatment phase also in-
cludes minor surgery in the form of cosmetic changes in facial struc-
ture, radical electrolysis, and silicone implants, procedures not un-
commonly sought by medical consumers. Many transsexuals remain
63. Transsexuals also face legal problems when they marry, problems not
unlike those of homosexuals. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
They also face potential employment discrimination. See Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Legal issues in this paper are nar-
rowed to focus on cross-dressing and changes in vital records to illustrate the law's
confusion of sex and gender.
64. See People v. Archibald, 58 Misc. 2d 862, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968), affd
per curiam, 27 N.Y.2d 504, 312 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1970); In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813,
293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
65. The majority of individuals seeking this type of surgical intervention are
male.
This language (e.g., male to reconstructed female) is derived from Raymond's
discussion of the phenomenon. In a note to her article, she explains: [wlhile transsex-
uals are masculine or feminine, they are not fundamentally male or female. As I shall
attempt to demonstrate, transsexuals undergo superficial, stereotypical, and artifactual
changes which reinforce socially constructed roles and identities." Raymond, supra
Note 55, at 11.
66. Psycho-social adjustment training has been criticized by many, especially
feminists, for its blatant intention to inculcate stereotypical attitudes and roles in
pre-operative transsexuals. During this phase, male to reconstructed females learn to
become "feminine" by learning makeup, grooming, etiquette skills as well as vocational
skills such as typing, shorthand, etc.
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in limbo, one step ahead of even the pre-operative stage because of a
somatic unsuitability precluding successful post-surgical adjustment.
Others undergo hormonal and related treatment only to remain at
that stage, because they cannot afford the costly and painful
surgical process. During the pre-operative stage transsexuals are
most vulnerable and usually first confront the legal system.
While all transsexuals necessarily undergo periods of
transvestism, 7 not all transvestites are transsexuals; there is an im-
portant qualitative difference between the two populations."
Transvestites are primarily heterosexual men who dress in women's
clothing, or what is termed "drag," for erotic stimulation." While
there exists a portion of the homosexual subculture also engaging in
cross-dressing,0 this group does so only to burlesque female roles. In
subcultural terms, drag is a form of "camp." Neither drag queens
nor true transvestites cross-dress out of an intense desire to be
female. Homosexuals are men seeking out emotional and erotic at-
tachment with other men. Transvestites cross-dress in a very cir-
cumscribed way for sexual gratification.
7 1
Transsexuals are usually confused with homosexuals and
transvestites because of what appear to be behavioral similarities.
Closer examination reveals the transsexual motivation for cross-
dressing is radically different; it is a striving toward ontological
order. For the transsexual trying desperately to bring psychosocial
identity into alignment with physical reality, successful cross-
dressing is an important goal. Accordingly, transsexual cross-
dressing is viewed by sex reassignment coordinators as an ap-
propriate adjustment phase for those awaiting final surgery. Since
cross-dressing is also considered an extreme violation of social
mores as well as a legal infraction, it is not a therapeutic program
entered into, or even devised lightly. Transvestism is prohibited by
law in the majority of states.7 2 Hence, in order to become unob-
67. The term "transvestism" itself was coined only in 1910 by Mangus Hirsh-
feld, a leader of the German Homosexual Rights Movement at the turn of the cen-
tury. See Bullough, Transvestites in the Middle Ages, 79 AM. J. Soc. 1381 (1974).
68. The popular misconceptions are clearly mapped in D. FEINBLOOM, supra
note 59.
69. "Drag" can be either partial or full. A transvestite might gain erotic
satisfaction from wearing only women's undergarments. Others might need to dress
and pass on the streets as a woman for satisfaction.
70. E. NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP: FEMALE IMPERSONATORS IN AMERICA (1972).
71. D. FEINBLOOM, supra note 59; Levine, Dressing-up in Limbo, NEW TIMES,
August 7, 1978, at 51.
72. See Smith, supra note 8, at 989; Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 8, at
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trusively "normal," transsexuals are required by the medical
establishment to actively engage in criminal activity.
Statutes pertaining to transvestism in the United States have
both religious and secular origins. The older and more familiar pro-
hibition against cross-dressing appears in Deuteronomy and is part
of a Judeo-Christian ethical heritage of carefully preserved sex
distinctions: "No woman shall wear an article of man's clothing, nor
shall a man put on a woman's dress; for those who do these things
are abominable to the Lord your God."7
Despite these Biblical origins, social historians note that female
transvestism was neither infrequent nor harshly condemned during
the Middle Ages. Male cross-dressers were, in comparison, highly
stigmatized and hence rare in number. This suggests that the social
hostility toward cross-dressing had. more to do with status gains and
loss than religious heresy or psychopathology. Bullough, writing on
the transvestic saints in the Middle Ages, explains:
A female who secretly wore men's clothes was not
considered abnormal. That a female might desire to be a
male, in fact, seemed to be a healthy desire, a normal
longing not unlike the desire of a peasant to become a no-
ble. This did not mean that either women or peasants
were allowed to cross the status lines in great numbers
but that the desire to do so was accepted as a norm.
Though men might dress as women at carnivals, and the
lord might mix with peasants at various festivals, the
status loss in any real change along these lines was so
threatening that anything more than play acting was for-
bidden."
The modern secular origins are exemplified by the now
superseded New York State Code of Criminal Procedure Section
887(7). The statute prohibiting transvestism, or female impersona-
tion, originated in part as a reaction to Anti-Rent Riots waged by
73. Deuteronomy 22:5 (New English).
74. Bullough, supra note 67, at 1392. This viewpoint seems to be challenged
by the example of Jeanne d'Arc, one transvestic saint who was convicted and executed
as much for her male garb as her supposedly heretical visions. This is explained by
Bullough: "Quite obviously, for a woman -to assume a male guise to become more holy
was permitted, but to compete with men on masculine grounds such as warfare was
simply not permitted. Such competition represented not a gain in the status of women
but a loss of status for men, since a mere woman could succeed at what they regarded
as strictly male tasks." Id. at 1892.
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Hudson Valley farmers. Citing the legislative history of this provi-
sion, Markowitz, dissenting in People v. Archibald,5 reports:
The rioting had reached such intensity that a state of in-
surrection had been declared. This particular statute was
addressed to a specific group of insurrectionists who,
while disguised as "Indians", murdered law enforcement
officers attempting to serve writs upon the farmers. The
"Indians" were in fact farmers, who as part of their
costumes, wore women's calico dresses to further conceal
their identities. The only connection this section has with
men attired in female clothing was the fact that the attire
was used in furtherance of a scheme of murder and insur-
rection."
There are no laws specifically prohibiting transsexual trans-
vestism. When transsexuals are arrested, it is under the aegis of
state and municipal laws commonly used to adjudicate those engag-
ing in vagrancy and prostitution; cross-dressing per se is seen as an
ancillary offense. Most cases involving cross-dressing typically have
little to do with transsexualism or even true transvestism. Never-
theless, they serve as precedent to bolster court opinion in cases
that do involve transsexuals. The courts must deal with transsexual
transvestism differently to deal with it meaningfully. In the end,
however, the constitutional issues are the same.
In People v. Archibald77 the defendant was apprehended wear-
ing a white evening gown, high heels, a blond wig, women's lingerie,
and makeup while waiting for a subway. He admitted that "the only
reason he was dressed in women's clothing was to attend a mas-
querade party where he had been drinking; that he had never been
arrested; that he was gainfully employed; that he had visible means
of support; and that he did not make a habit of dressing in female
attire."' As the dissent pointed out, these circumstances excluded
him from the statutory guidelines. However, since the statutory
guidelines did not clearly include intent to commit an illegal act as a
consideration, the court rejected defense counsel reasoning on those
grounds, as well as the subsequent constitutional argument that ar-
rest represented an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of police
power because of the statute's vagueness." The defendant was con-
75. 58 Misc. 2d 862, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968).
76. I& at 864, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
77. Id.
78. Id- at 865, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
79. I& at 863-64, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 836-37.
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victed under New York State vagrancy laws prohibiting female im-
personation. The dissent by Justice Markowitz makes this case par-
ticularly noteworthy. It documents legislative history to validate the
defense position that "no 'reasonable relationship,' no 'fair, just or
reasonable connection,' no rational nexus [existed] between the pub-
lic good and the conduct here involved.""
Although the decision does note the punishable act was "ob-
viously not directed at the state of 'feeling compelled' [toward
female impersonation],"8' this case did not address transsexuals
specifically. When faced with such a "complusion," courts have had
to alter considerably their approach to cross-dressing. In City of
Columbus v. Zanders" the defendant, a transsexual, was arrested
under an ordinance which read: "No person shall appear upon any
public street or other public place in a state of nudity or in a dress
not belonging to his or her sex, or in an indecent or lewd dress.""
This case represents a classic example of the constitutional
issues the defense must argue. In Zanders, the defense argued the
ordinance violated the right of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment; the right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment; deprived the defendant of due process guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment
contrary to the Eighth Amendment through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Here the court appropriately ex-
amined the rational relationship between the section under question
and the "health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public.""6
Having done so, the court upheld the constitutionality of the code,
maintaining a rational relationship did exist:
There are numerous subjects who would want to change
their sex identity in order to perpetuate crimes of
homicide, rape, robbery, assault, etc. We hold, therefore,
that Section 2343.04 of the Columbus City Code has a real
and substantial relation to the public safety and is
therefore constitutional and a valid exercise of police
power."
80. Id. at 866, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
81. Id. at 864, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
82. 25 Ohio Misc. 144, 266 N.E.2d 602 (1970).
83. COLUMBUS MUNICIPAL CODE § 2343.04.
84. 25 Ohio Misc. at 146, 266 N.E.2d at 604.
85. Id. at 147, 266 N.E.2d at 604.
86. Id. at 147, 266 N.E.2d at 604.
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The court in Zanders did, however, develop a "mental fitness"
test to account for transsexuals. The court relied heavily on
psychiatric testimony from the defendant's doctor, as well as impor-
tant articles and statements about transsexualism. Included in the
text of the opinion is a long citation from Dr. Harry Benjamin, a
noted expert in the field, explaining:
The legal motive is strong in all transsexuals. They
want a change of their legal status. Red tape is their
worst enemy. Their constant fear of discovery, arrest, and
prosecution makes life miserable for them before the
operation, and even afterwards they have to fight for the
necessary legal changes....
This type of law, unfortunately, allows no application
of common sense-only a literal interpretation of a
statute that was formulated without knowledge of this
particular subject."
The court developed and adopted the medical model of illness
as the legal standard. Thus, since transsexualism involves a "mental
defect" not practically controllable, the defendant was absolved of
criminal responsibility and the case was dismissed.
In People v. Simmons," a case concerning cross-dressing after
the repeal of Section 887(7) of the New York State Code of Criminal
Procedure, the court used this opportunity to define transvestism,
transsexualism, and ancillary acts of cross-dressing. After reviewing
relevant cases, the court rejected, as insufficient, evidence
presented to charge criminal impersonation and concluded the
statute was inapplicable- the defendant was only dressed in "dif-
ferent" clothes.
Finally, criminal intent and First Amendment rights were reex-
amined in City of Cincinnati v. Adams," another case involving a
transvestite arrested under a city ordinance prohibiting one to "ap-
pear in dress or costume not customarily worn by his or her sex ...
with intent to commit an indecent or immoral act.""0
While rejecting the first amendment argument for cross-
dressing as protected conduct, and upholding previous decisions pro-
87. 1& at 149, 266 N.E.2d at 605 (emphasis in original).
88. 79 Misc. 2d 249, 357 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1974).
89. 42 Ohio Misc. 48, 330 N.E.2d 463 (1974).
90. 1I at 48-49, 330 N.E.2d at 463.
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hibiting such behavior when clearly associated with criminality, this
case was dismissed on the grounds that the ordinance was violative
of the defendant's due process rights. Here the court invoked the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, a principle holding that legal standards
are inadequate if they fail "to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the state.
The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to
be proscribed." 91 Here the court referred to the amorphic notion of
"appropriate apparel" in light of an increasing indistinguishability
between male and female fashion.
Courts have noted the importance of clarifying the contradic-
tion between statutory purpose and judicial application in cross-
dressing arrests involving transsexuals. It is obviously difficult to
insist that transsexualism is a form of female impersonation when
the opposite sex is simply not being "impersonated". Transsexuals
are the sex they say they are. To date, transsexual cross-dressing is
acknowledged and exonerated at law by applying a medical model of
illness.
Adopting a medical model has, however, serious and severe
limitations because it shifts the locus of responsibility from society
to the individual." The clothing one wears is a manifestation of
gender. As long as transsexuals, and other individuals who do not
conform to traditional gender prescriptions, are seen as "sick" or
"mentally deficient" such rigidities will endure.
The Markowitz dissent in Archibald" is important because it
acknowledges, as early as 1969, changing social norms particularly
with regard to physical adornment. Referring to the notion of
female impersonation in the vagrancy statutes, Markowitz argued:
If appellant's conviction was correct, then circus
clowns, strangely attired 'hippies', flowing-haired 'yippies'
and every person who would indulge in the Halloween
tradition of 'Trick or Treat' ipso facto may be targets for
criminal sanctions as vagrants. Today women are wearing
91. Id& at 51, 330 N.E.2d at 465.
92. The medical model has been thoroughly critiqued in the sociological
literature. See T. SZAsz. THE MYTH OF MENTAL HEALTH. See also I. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS
(1971); R. LEITER, IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH (1969); P. MANNING & M. ZUCKER,
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ILLNESS (1976); T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL
(1966).
93. 58 Misc. 2d at 864, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
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their hair increasingly shorter, and men are wearing their
hair increasingly longer. Facial makeup, hair dyeing and
cosmetic treatment are no longer the exclusive province
of women. Men's and women's clothing styles are becom-
ing increasingly similar. Thus, carrying the majority view
to its logical conclusion, a young man or woman could
possibly be convicted under this section as a vagrant
merely for venturing into the street in his or her normal
attire, which is otherwise acceptable in society today."
Similarly in Adams, Judge Gorman considered the issue of
dress codes and noted the issue was not exclusive to the public sec-
tor, reasoning:
It [prohibitions against dress] goes so far as to bring
under suspect the woman who wears one of her husband's
old shirts to paint lawn furniture, the trick or treater, the
guests at a masquerade party, or the entertainer. Such a
standard is purely objective and materially fluctuates
from person to person. Additionally, the element of an in-
tent to commit an 'indecent' or 'immoral' act, while so'
dressed, represents an unascertainable standard."
Acquitting transsexuals of transvestism solely on mental health
grounds may be expeditious, but is shortsighted. Statutes pro-
hibiting cross-dressing represent instances of gender discrimination
aimed primarily at men. American women currently enjoy enormous
latitude in their public attire. Much of the clothing manufactured for
women is indistinguishable from that designed for men. Men,
however, cannot claim the same range of flexibility. Men in con-
temporary society may indeed wear limited amounts of jewelry, use
perfume, and may crimp or dye their hair-things traditionally con-
sidered the fashion perogative of women. Yet men cannot, for exam-
ple, wear cotton sundresses during summer heatwaves. Interestingly
enough, it is virtually impossible to think of an example of inap-
propriate clothing for men which is not, at the same time, the most
gender specific, stereotypical clothing for women. It is hardly sur-
prising that the clothing considered taboo for men is limited almost
exclusively to skirts, dresses, gowns, and underwear. It is not coin-
cidental that this clothing is criticized by feminists because it
restricts physical movement and most certainly reifies gender
stereotypes about women as fragile, dainty, and childlike.
94. 1& at 865-66, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 838-39.
95. 42 Ohio Misc. at 51, 330 N.E.2d at 466.
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In sum, a review of the cases relevant to cross-dressing reveals
a willingness by the courts to alter such statutes to account for
"odd" populations, but an unwillingness to declare unconstitutional
the gender discrimination that inheres in such laws.
Vital Records
Once physiology is aligned with gender identity, post-operative
transsexuals are, for all practical purposes, "women" and "men."
This now irreversible status" marks the final and most critical stage
of transsexual psychosocial development: the creation of an in-
tegrated individual. Success or failure at this point is measured by
the degree to which the post-operative transsexual blends in-
conspicuously into society. 7 Quite simply, the post-op must create a
consistent autobiography. Legal assistance is required to eliminate
discrepancies from vital records which, if revealed, would smash the
desired "presentation of self."" Legal entanglements now concern
name and sex alterations on birth certificates; here the socio-legal
contradictions of sex and gender become most evident.
A name change is a relatively common and simple procedure.
Individuals can and do petition the courts to alter both given names
and surnames they considered embarrassing, ridiculous or cumber-
some. Courts enjoy wide discretion in this area and have been
known to deny petitions on virtually any grounds. Such denials are
only occasionally overturned on review."
Litigation in this area has been pursued primarily by women
who often suffer as a consequence of judicial whim.' Gender issues
are revealed when courts deny a woman's petition to replace her
married name with her birth-given one. The Lucy Stone League,
96. In fact, there is very limited reversibility at the pre-operative stage. Even
post-operative transsexuals can receive hormonal replacement therapy, etc. However,
the radical surgery (e.g., double mastectomy, hysterectomy, castration) cannot be
reversed. Only three of 160 Stanford patients-men prior to surgery-changed their
minds. One reported a religious revelation, one complained that his social life suffered,
and the third said he had difficulty finding work as a woman that was well paid. These
"men" must now cross-dress as men. Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1977, at 21, col. 2.
97. Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 8, at 253.
98. E. GOFFMAN. THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); H . GAR-
FINKEL, Passing and the Managed Achievement of Sex Status in an Intersexed Person,
in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 116 (1967).
99. See B. BABCOCK, et al., supra note 22, at 579, for a full discussion, citing
other works and cases.
100. See generally CENTER FOR A WOMAN'S OWN NAME BOOKLET FOR WOMEN
'WHO WISH TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN NAMES AFTER MARRIAGE (1974).
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formed in 1921, fought for and won the legal right of women to re-
tain birth-given names on government documents by emphasizing
the notions of identity and individuality.' The emphasis on in-
dividuality appeals to an important facet of American bourgeois
ideology, and this feminist struggle received wide public support at
the time. A New York World editorial in August 1924, typified
public sentiment:
[N]o wife wishes to feel that she must wear her husband's
name like the silver dollar or a serf if she is to obtain the
recognition of the Federal Government. A woman is as
much an individual after she marries as before. She should
have the right to sign herself as she pleases, whether on
private notes or payrolls. It is none of the Government's
proper business how she signs herself so long as she is
identified.' 2
Today only Hawaii requires women to adopt their husband's
names upon marriage,'0 3 although women may petition for subse-
quent name changes. The social sentiments which move judges to
deny such changes are even more sharply revealed by their
response to women petitioning to neutralize or matrilinealize sur-
names containing patrilineal prefixes or suffixes.'" These petitions
are often regarded as "nonsense"'0 5 and granted only after a ritual
degradation ceremony" is performed by the presiding judge.
Female post-ops with "male" names present obvious in-
congruities and courts are forced to recognize and deal with them
seriously. There is little contest here over the issue of identity.
Relying on "common sense," courts have granted name changes to
transsexuals. In In re Anonymous,'T M decided in 1968, the New York
City Civil Court went beyond the administrative issues raised in the
earlier case of Anonymous v. Weiner."8 The court reaffirmed that
"an individual may assume any name, absent of fraud or an in-
terference with the rights of others .... "" In this case the court
confronted the large ramifications of such petitions by transsexuals,
101. Id.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Such as: O'Neill or Henderson.
105. Id. at 39.
106. See Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM.
J. Soc. 420 (1956).
107. 57 Misc. 2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
108. 50 Misc. 2d 380, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
109. 57 Misc. 2d at 814, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
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admitting that "any difficulty presented herein is not so much in the
nature of the problem itself, but in trying to apply, perhaps inade-
quately, static rules of law to situations such as that presented
herein, which perhaps merit such rules and/or progressive legisla-
tion.""' In his opinion, Judge Pecora specifically addressed the fun-
damental issues of status and identity with remarkable medico-legal
thoroughness. The Weiner chromosome based test was expressly
discarded. Instead, social reality featured heavily in the court's stan-
dard:
Where there is a disharmony between the physiological
sex and the anatomical sex, the social sex or gender of the
individual will be determined by the anatomical sex.
Where, however, with or without medical intervention,
the psychological sex and the anatomical sex are har-
monized, then the social sex or gender of the individuals
should be made to conform to the harmonized status of
the individual, and, if such conformity requires changes of
a statistical nature, then such changes should be made. Of
course, such changes should be made only in those cases
where physiological orientation is complete."'
Until recently, most courts have not been favorably inclined to
extend Pecora's reasoned combination of psychological gender and
anatomical sex as the standard for considering alterations of sex
status on birth certificates. Until 1971, such requests in New York
State were, for example, considered against a rigid medical standard
and summarily dismissed.
Prior to the development of sex reassignment surgery, altera-
tions in the designated sex status on birth certificates were limited
to "obvious" errors." ' In most instances, these are clarified and cor-
rected by hospital personnel without judicial intervention. Cases
necessitating judicial intervention for birth certificate changes have
generally concerned age"' or race."' Several states. 5 presently
acknowledge the transsexual phenomenon and outline specific pro-
110. Id at 814, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
111. I(L at 816, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 837.
112. Examples include the case of a hermaphrodite infant or the extreme in-
stance of an error during circumcision. Decisions about the subsequent sex are made
by hospital personnel, either with or without parental knowledge or consent.
113. See B. BABCOCK, et aL, supra note 22, at 579, for relevant cases.
114. Id
115. Alabama, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Texas, Iowa, Colorado, and Min-
nesota. See Smith, supra note 8, at 994 n.213.
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cedures to change, correct, alter, or amend birth certificates. In lieu
of special consideration, transsexuals may attempt birth certificate
changes in other states under either "correction" or "alteration"
statutes of vital statistics laws. Neither of these provide a totally
satisfactory solution for transsexuals.
A correction statute is unsatisfactory because the transsexual
must prove his/her original sex determination was incorrect when
sex was correctly designated at birth. The reliance here on medical
criteria is inappropriate since it fails to account for gender.
Transsexualism involves extreme core gender dysphoria and, since
the law fails to make a distinction between sex and gender, there
are practicably no means by which a transsexual can make an ade-
quate case for correction. Sole reliance on specific medical criteria is
inadequate; social psychological criteria must be considered.
Statutes allowing alterations are also inadequate. Here the act
of alteration itself alerts any observer to change. This obviously
undermines the transsexual's need to create a unified past and it
becomes just as important to litigate the manner of alteration.116
During the mid-60s, when transsexuals first petitioned the
courts, no such provisions for transsexuals existed per se. It is
useful to this discussion of sex and gender to review those cases and
the rationale supporting the perfunctory denial of such requests.
The first significant case concerning correction, Anonymous v.
Weiner,1 7 came before the New York State Supreme Court in 1966.
The petitioner had already changed her name to reflect her female
role and was living as a woman. The court denied her application for
a change in sex status on her birth certificate. Although there
already existed precedent for such change, the court upheld a New
York City Department of Health resolution to deny such further
amendments. The Board of Health was commended by the court for
having consulted the New York Academy of Medicine for recommen-
dations on the matter. The Academy had convened a committee of
medical, psychiatric, and legal specialists at the Board's request and
subsequently recommended a chromosomal standard be adopted to
determine legal sex. Although the committee had convened to con-
sider specifically legal and presumably psychosocial needs of
transsexuals, it rejected the aspect of psychological relief and found
116. See Smith, supra note 8, at 996, for an extensive discussion of "correc-
tion" and "alteration" statutes.
117. 50 Misc. 2d 380, 383, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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that "the desire of concealment of a change of sex by the transsex-
ual is outweighed by the public interest for protection against
fraud... 8 Relying on these findings, the Board of Health in 1965
resolved that petitions for sex changes on birth certificates would
not be granted.
However, the real issue in Weiner-whether or not to grant
social psychological relief to transsexuals by legal remedy-was
subordinated by the court to jurisdictional policy considerations.
The case was in fact decided on an administrative point, that the
Board's jurisdiction and discretion would not be usurped by the
court. The decision has been severely criticized,"9 and justifiably so,
for the court's reluctance to deal meaningfully with transsexualism.
Nevertheless, the chromosomal standard adhered to in Weiner,
as narrow and technically inaccurate'"2 as it was, remained fun-
damentally unchallenged until 1971 when the Board of Health
amended the New York City Health Code to add: "A new birth cer-
tificate shall be filed when . . . the name of the person has been
changed pursuant to court order and proof satisfactory to the
Department has been submitted that such person has undergone
convertive surgery.''
Two years later, Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records" in-
volved a post-operative transsexual seeking a change of sex on her
birth certificate. The Bureau issued a new certificate, changing the
name and omitting entirely the sex status alteration. This, the peti-
tioner charged, was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.
Here the court again refused to overstep jurisdictional boundaries
and deferred to the "expertise" of the Board which had, since the
Weiner decision, amended the health code to accommodate transsex-
uals. Nevertheless, Board minutes revealed that the amendment was
unanimously adopted to reissue certificates without including sex
designations"'2 at all because
118. Id.
119. See Smith, supra note 8, at 998 n.234, for reference to this literature.
120. For a full discussion of the inaccuracies of a chromosomal standard, see
Holloway, supra note 8, at 286; Smith, supra note 8, at 965; Transsexuals in Limbo,
supra note 8, at 237.
121. N.Y. CITY HEALTH CODE § 207.05(a)(5).
122. 75 Misc. 2d 229, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
123. The text of this case demonstrates the imprecision with which the law
treats sex and gender. After referring repeatedly to "sex designations" the opinion
then states: "If the Board has seen fit to issue a birth certificate for a transsexual,
without disclosure of gender, such a determination is indeed well supported." Id. at
232, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (emphasis added).
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the board was of the opinion that surgery for the
transsexual is an experimental form of psychotherapy by
which mutilating surgery is conducted on a person with
the intent of setting his mind at ease, and that
nonetheless, does not change the body cells governing sex-
uality. In the words of one of the medical members of the
board: 'I would think that it would be unsound, if, in fact,
there were encouragement to the broader use of this
means of resolving a person's unhappy mental state."2
Hartin's petition was denied and dismissed.
In perhaps the most significant case of this sort, Darnell v.
Lloyd,2 ' a post-operative transsexual, under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, raised a constitutional equal protection claim when
the Connecticut Comissioner of Health refused to change the sex
designation on her birth certificate. When the state moved to
dismiss, alleging the absence of any constitutional claim, the district
court denied the motion, ruling instead that a cause of action did
exist. The exact circumstances of the case, and of the plaintiffs
post-operative sex status, are not clearly discernible from the deci-
sion itself. It is clear, however, that the court would not defer to the
Health Commissioner's "expertise" in this matter, and would con-
sider seriously the alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
Noting that charges of "underinclusiveness" like those alleged in
Darnell's complaint are not favored by the courts, the judge in-
dicated that "fundamental interests at stake" dictated otherwise in
this case:
Darnell claims that a birth certificate is a government-
issued identification card that has a significant impact on
many phases of one's life. For instance, she claims that
she will be unable to obtain a license to marry a man
unless she can produce a birth certificate proclaiming her
a female. The humiliation of carrying a passport declaring
one to be of the other than his or her apparent sex is easily
imagined. It may be that none of the consequences direct-
ly implicates one of the traditional 'fundamental interests'
. . . but this litany . . . suggests that the Commissioner
must show some substantial state interest in his policy of
124. M This is not unlike the feminist analysis proposed by Raymond, supra
note 55.
125. 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975).
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refusing to change birth certificates to reflect current sex-
ual status unless that status also obtained at birth.
126
Sex is a status appearing on birth certificates; important legal
documents serving to confirm existence and identity in this complex,
bureaucratized society. Birth certificates are used to obtain jobs,
social security, passports, insurance, and marriage licenses.'" The
exclusion of sex on this document was important enough to persuade
the district court in Darnell to consider the possibility of an equal
protection violation because of its absence. If it can bedemonstrated
that the absence of such a designation has discriminatory impact,
then it would seem the reverse is also true: sex is an important
status which affects employment, insurance, marriage, and so forth.
While Darnell remains unresolved to date,'2 8 it offers the first indica-
tion that a court might finally consider the fundamental socio-legal
issue raised by transsexualism: whether legal sex should be deter-
mined at all.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The reassignment surgery sought by transsexuals is a surgical
solution to a social problem, one of sex status reified as gender.
While it is both possible and important to separate sex from gender,
the cases, comments, notes and articles about transsexuals fail to do
so and focus almost entirely on creating a legal standard for sex.
The establishment of any legal standard necessitates a critical ex-
amination of its underlying assumptions before it is incorporated into
the judicial process. This the law has not done. Courts continue to
make decisions based on socially produced, sex related behavior, or
gender. It is generally agreed that its inevitable clash with social
reality renders a medical standard for sex inappropriate. Commen-
tators have proposed a social psychological standard that accounts
for self concept as well as anatomy. While this seems a necessary
and humanitarian legal solution for transsexuals, it is as seriously
flawed as the medical model is for adjudicating the problems of
cross-dressers. This standard in fact perpetuates those gender
dimensions pervading legal notions of sex. It is unlikely the courts
126. Id. at 1314. The court documented the tangential interests of marriage,
traveling, privacy and identification with extensive case citations, which have been
omitted.
127. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1000; Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 8, at
243, for discussion of the legal impact of birth certificates.
128. This case was later settled out of court.
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would knowingly articulate a standard based on gender. Because of
the cultural and historical variability of gender, acknowledging and
accounting for it would devastate all principles of equal protection.
The courts have, nevertheless, devised and relied upon a gender
based legal standard for sex to account for special cases such as
transsexuals. Until sex or gender is determined to be a legitimate
legal concern in the first place, discrimination against both women
and men will persist; the law remaining at best, inadequate.
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